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Contemporary politics seems to suffer from a carelessness with regards to
truth. This thesis aimed to clarify whether contemporary politics is really
post-truth. It did this through an analysis of multiple theories of truth and an
overview of the historical origins of post-truth. It concluded that while there
are multiple possible substantial theories of truth, all theories of truth have
in common the existence of a correctness-notion. Analysis of modern politics
shows that correctness-notions are still held by all relevant actors, which en-
tails that they hold at least some theory of truth. Rather than being post-truth,
contemporary politics suffers from political communities that have deeply
differing worldviews due to lobbying by interest groups, changes to modern
media, and post-modernism.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The political landscape of the western world seemed to change fundamen-
tally in 2016. Both the campaign for Brexit and the presidential campaign
of Donald Trump were filled with statements made without any regards for
truth and outright lies. Yet despite these lies, both campaigns experienced
great success. People worried that this disregard for truth was the begin-
ning of a larger phenomenon, that of ‘post-truth’. Lee McIntyre writes in his
overview of post-truth politics: “If Donald Trump could claim – without ev-
idence – that if he lost the election it was because it was rigged against him,
did facts and truth even matter?" (2). This carelessness with regards to how
the world really is continued after the elections, for example when President
Donald Trump claimed without evidence that he actually won the popular
vote if the three million illegal votes were disregarded, or when he claimed
that the Russians had not hacked the American elections, despite consensus
of all major American intelligence agencies (Holan; Sherman).
When asked about one of these discrepancies, a White House spokesper-
son talked about ‘alternative facts’, which John Searle states did not refer
to the trivially true claim that there are facts beyond the facts currently dis-
cussed, but rather that there might be one acknowledged fact, and another
equally valid fact that is inconsistent with the first (88). It can, if we accept al-
ternative facts, both be the case that the size of Trump’s inauguration crowd
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was much smaller than other inauguration crowds in recent history and that
it was the biggest ever. If we are currently in a post-truth era, this would
have major consequences for how we live our lives and how we do politics.
What would it mean for an era to be post-truth? Searle writes that “In in-
tellectual matters the idea that some phenomenon B is ‘post’ some other phe-
nomenon A typically suggests more than just that A and B are in a temporal
sequence but that somehow phenomena A has been superseded or surpassed
by phenomenon B and even on occasion that A has now become obsolete”
(87). Following this, post-truth would not merely be a term that happens
after the notion of ‘truth’, but offer such a rejection of truth that the entire
notion of truth is made obsolete. It would have to argue that the notion of
truth is meaningless because it does not in fact name anything.
This thesis will attempt to uncover whether modern politics has indeed
made a shift from truth to post-truth in the sense given above. To do this,
it is first necessary to define what exactly is meant by ‘truth’. If truth is not
given a clear definition, it will be impossible to determine whether the cur-
rent political climate is post-truth. It will do this by first discussing the most
important theories of truth, then by discussing the different meanings given
to the terms realism and idealism, and finally by looking at the relation be-
tween these theories of truth, epistemology and ontology. It will also aim to
find common ground between these theories.
The second part of this thesis will first provide more insight into post-
truth by looking at its origins in science denialism, changes in modern me-
dia, and post-modernism. Then, it will discuss the relation between truth
and post-truth by looking at the relation to truth of each of these parts of the
origin.
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This thesis will argue that ‘post-truth’ is a misnomer, and that rather than
a diminished importance of truth in contemporary politics, the real issue is
a use of partisan media and post-modern rhetoric by those in power and a
divide in accepted authorities and sources of information between different
political communities.
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Theories of Truth
As stated in the introduction, to establish whether the current political era
has moved beyond the concept of truth, it is first necessary to define the con-
cept of truth. This is not a straightforward task, as there are many different
theories of what ‘truth’ is. While one theory (or group of theories), the cor-
respondence theory of truth, can be said to be the most commonly accepted,
this theory is not without problems, and there are valid reasons to adopt
other theories of truth. This chapter will outline the most common theories
of truth, and the reasons for adopting them.
2.1 The Correspondence Theory of Truth
Generally, most people, either consciously or unconsciously, act on the basis
of a conception of truth in which we hold that a judgement or statement is
true when what the statements expresses actually is the case. This is, in a
general form, the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence the-
ory of truth states that a judgement is true if and only if it corresponds to the
facts or state of affairs in the world. Any theory that characterises the truth
of a judgement as a certain relation between the judgement and the world
is a correspondence theory. There is not a single correspondence theory, but
rather a cluster of theories, that differ in how exactly they categorise what
is being related to the world (judgement, proposition, etc.), the exact nature
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of this relation (correspondence, agreement, picture-relation, representation,
etc.), and their conceptualisation of the relevant parts of the world (facts,
states of affairs, tropes, etc.). Furthermore, there are differences in what ex-
actly the correspondence theory of truth is taken to be a theory of. It can
either be seen as a definition of truth, where is explains the meaning of ‘be-
ing true’, or as providing the criterion of truth, arguing that the (best) way
to determine whether a judgement is true is by comparing it to the world.
While there is no single correspondence theory of truth, it is useful to discuss
them as a class, as these theories share a lot of qualities.
Correspondence theories have a lot of historic and present-day impor-
tance. It can be found in the works of Aristotle, who stated that “to say of
what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what
is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” (Warrington, 1011b25).
Similar statements can be found in Plato (Sedley & Margaret, 385b2; Plato
trans. Rowe, 263b). It has maintained this prominent position throughout
the history of philosophy. The correspondence theory also best describes
how ‘truth’ is used in everyday discourse. Most people will say that ‘the ta-
ble is square’ is true if the table is square.
A correspondence theorist needs to clarify three things, namely what part
of the judgement corresponds to the world, what this correspondence rela-
tion consists of, and which part of reality the judgement coheres to.
First of all, the idea of a judgement corresponding to anything other than
a judgement has been criticised. Berkeley, for example, writes that “an idea
can be like nothing but an idea” (27). However, this problem might rest on
the double meaning of the term ‘judgement’, which refers both to the act of
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judging and to the product of this act. In the case of the correspondence the-
ory, it is not the act, but the content that is taken to correspond. While the act
of judging might not be comparable to the world, this is not the case for the
product of this act. It is this product of judgement of which the theory says
that it is true or not. The act of judging is correct or not based on whether
its content is true. When we talk about a judgement being correct, this refers
to the act of judging, whereas a judgement being true refers to the product
of this judging. The abstract content of the judgement can also be called the
proposition, which is taken to be a non-psychological, non-physical entity
that exist independent of the act of judging (Ewing, 197).
Secondly, it needs to be clarified what correspondence consists of and
how we determine when something corresponds. Opponents of the corre-
spondence theory hold that no satisfactory account can be given of this rela-
tion. Whether it is seen as copying, similarity in structure or one-to-one re-
lation, serious issues seem to arise. However, this does not necessarily need
to bother the correspondence theorist. A. C. Ewing states that the issues are
unproblematic and can safely be ignored:
It seems clear, however, that such criticism cannot be final, for the reason why
all accounts of it involve great difficulties may be simply that the relation is
unique and unanalysable. In that case we need not be troubled by our fail-
ure to give an account of it in terms of other relations, because it is simply
not identical in character with any other relation or combination of relations.
Our failure to define it may be simply due to the fact that it is intrinsically
such as neither to require nor to admit of a definition. (195-196)
Even if the correspondence relation needs clarification, this does not entail
that the definition of truth could not follow the correspondence notion, but
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simply that our current correspondence theory might fail in capturing this
notion. To reject the correspondence theory of truth it is not enough to show
that it currently does not work, but rather that it cannot work.
Thirdly, the theory needs to explain which part of reality the judgement
corresponds to. The family of correspondence theories can be divided into
object-based theories and fact-based theories. The object-based theories as-
sume that the judgement has a subject-predicate structure and take the judge-
ment to be true if this subject-predicate relation holds for the relevant object
in the world. Object-based theories include two relations, one between the
subject and the predicate, and one between the subject of the judgement with
the object in the world. For fact-based theories judgements do not have to
have this subject-predicate structure, but rather should describe a fact or state
of affairs in the world. The proposition is taken to be true if the fact or state
of affairs obtain.
However, both types suffer from the same issue. If truth is based on cor-
respondence with facts or objects in the world, we cannot not know whether
judgements correspond to these facts or objects. To do so would either re-
quire us to have judgements about these facts and objects existing in a cer-
tain way, which would make the theory circular, or would require us to have
direct access to the facts, which we do not seem to have. Ewing writes that
We cannot test the truth of a judgment by seeing whether it corresponds to
facts without, so to speak, translating these facts into other judgments. Facts
can only be reached through cognitive processes, and therefore the results of a
cognitive process can only be tested by other processes. What we call testing
by reference to facts is really testing by reference to more elementary cogni-
tions. Sensation as mere feeling must give rise to judgment before it can be
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used as a test. (198)
This refutes the view that correspondence is the criterion of truth, but not
necessarily that it is the definition of truth. Correspondence could constitute
the nature of truth without constituting its criterion. However, this does lead
to a position of radical scepticism, as it entails that it is possible that we can
be wrong about everything we hold to be true. Many reject this form of the
correspondence theory, as they think that this possibility is absurd. This also
leads some verificationists to reject the theory. According to verificationism
a claim must be implied by a finite number of observations in order to be
meaningful. Holding the correspondence theory to be a definitional theory
of truth would turn all our judgements meaningless, as no amount of obser-
vations could ever confirm them.
Another objection doubts the possibility of a connection between judge-
ments and ‘the facts’. This objection comes in two forms: either it denies
that facts exist, or that objective similarities exist. The denial of facts is based
on the connection between true judgements and the facts. While the cor-
respondence theorist might argue that correspondence is a necessary notion
because it is obvious that what is true is that which is the case, it can similarly
be said that what is the case is obviously that which is true. If facts are deter-
mined by true sentences, we cannot base the notion of truth on them, as this
would be circular. Quine argues that facts are fictions “projected from true
sentences for the sake of correspondence” (213). If facts are fictitious entities,
then we cannot base truth on them, and an alternative must be found. The
second form of this objections calls into question the possibility of objective
similarities between judgements and the world. This objection is based on
the assumption that there are infinitely many different ways in which things
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can be classified, and that in the end it is us that determine the classifica-
tion. Concepts like Goodman’s ‘grue’, which classifies together things that
are green before midnight tonight and things that are blue after midnight
tonight, or Kripke’s ‘quus’, where ‘x quus y’ = x + y if x, y < 57, but = 5
otherwise, can be argued to be as valid a way of classifying things as ‘blue’,
‘green’ and ‘plus’. It is not the case that we freely choose which concepts
to use, but that something in our minds chooses which concepts are used.
However, the objection argues, we cannot say that ‘greenness’ constitutes an
objective similarity between things any more than ‘grueness’ does. Not even
existence can be ascribed to independent reality. Existence is one of our con-
cepts, which divides between existents and non-existents, and could equally
well be replaced by the notion of ‘quexistence’ (Walker, 16). If we accept these
arguments, we have to conclude that there are either no similarities with or
features of reality independent of our system of concepts or endlessly many.
Neither can be permitted for the correspondence theory of truth to function.
If there do not exist privileged similarities with reality independent of our
concepts, we cannot depend on reality for the truth of our judgements. In
the absence of facts or privileged similarities between judgements and facts,
the correspondence theory of truth fails to specify a specific notion of truth
based on the way the world is. As such, an alternative will need to be found.
2.2 Alternative Theories of Truth
In the previous section we have seen that there are issues with the corre-
spondence theory of truth. If the correspondence theory of truth cannot be
maintained, it is necessary to look for other theories of truth. These theories
can be divided into two categories: substantial theories, which hold certain
views of what truth is, and deflational theories, which hold that a substantive
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analysis of truth is not possible. Substantial theories of truth include the cor-
respondence theory of truth, but also coherence theories of truth, which hold
that what it is for something to be true is for it to cohere with a defined set
of beliefs, where beliefs are taken to be accepted judgements, and traditional
pragmatic theories of truth, which (roughly) holds that theories are true if
they are useful to believe. Deflational theories hold that no definition can
be given of the concept ‘truth’. They argue that truth is transparent. There
seems to be no difference between saying that ‘Snow is white’ and saying that
‘It is true that snow is white’. If this is the case, then ‘truth’ has no individual
character beyond the statement of which it says something. Deflationalists
hold that because truth lacks any character, we can get rid of the concept all
together.
Of these alternative theories, this thesis shall focus on the coherence the-
ory of truth, as it has historically been seen as the main competitor to the
correspondence theory of truth, and is the most likely to present a meaning-
ful alternative to the correspondence theory of truth.
While deflationalism might seem like another alternative to the corre-
spondence theory, it suffers from several problems. Deflationalism has issues
explaining why truth is a norm of inquiry and assertion, cannot use a truth-
functional account of meaning, and cannot explain why true beliefs are more
successful than false beliefs. Furthermore, one could wonder whether defla-
tionalism argues against the concept of truth, or merely the semantic notion
’... is true’. If, as the argument goes, asserting ‘Snow is white is true’ is the
same as asserting ‘Snow is white’, because ‘Snow is white is true’ if and only
if ‘Snow is white’, then similarly, asserting ‘Snow is white’ asserts that it is
true that snow is white. While the addition of ‘is true’ might not have a dis-
tinct character, we are asserting that something is the case when we assert it.
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Deflationism should explain why their theory holds for the concept of truth
as a whole, or risk being a purely semantic theory about the sentence-part ’...
is true’.
So far, the coherence theory of truth has only been explained as stating
that what it is for something to be true is for it to cohere with a defined set of
beliefs. Before this theory can be defined in more detail, it is first necessary
to look at the reasons commonly held for accepting a coherence theory of
truth, which the next section will do, and at the relation between truth and
the world. The coherence theory will be presented in more detail in chapter
4.
2.3 Reasons For a Coherence Theory of Truth
Different philosophers may be drawn to a coherence theory of truth for dif-
ferent reasons. These reasons can be divided into two categories: ontological
reasons, where one accepts a coherence theory of truth because of a particular
belief of how the world is, and epistemological reasons, where one accepts
a coherence theory of truth because of a particular belief of how knowledge
works. The ontological reasons are a prior commitment to ontological ideal-
ism combined with the belief that coherence is the most likely shape of this
idealism, and the aforementioned idea that reality has no defined properties
(Candlish; Young). The epistemological reasons include a belief in verifica-
tionism, the idea that radical scepticism is absurd and that the coherence the-
ory can solve the sceptical challenge, and a prior acceptance of the coherence
theory of knowledge.
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2.3.1 Ontological Reasons
Early versions of the coherence theory of truth were primarily set forth by
idealists. According to Walker, coherentism was held by, among others, Spi-
noza, Fichte and Hegel (ix-x). Coherence theories of truth were also adopted
by many British idealists around the end of the 19th and the start of the 20th
century, among others by F.H. Bradley. Idealism, as an ontological position,
holds that there is no ontological distinction between a belief and the ob-
jective conditions that make this belief true (Young). Because of this, ide-
alism is naturally opposed to the correspondence theory of truth. We can-
not view mind-independent reality as the basis of truth if there is no mind-
independent reality. If, as idealism holds, reality is mind-dependent, there
is no ontological distinction between beliefs and reality. If there is no such
distinction, the truth of a belief cannot be a result of something which is not
a belief. Instead, it is other beliefs that make a belief true. This can be seen as
a form of the coherence theory of truth: the truth of a belief is determined by
whether a belief is supported by other true beliefs. In recent years, arguments
for the coherence theory of truth on the basis of ontological idealism have
become rare. This is mostly owing to the fact that realism has become the
dominant ontological position in philosophy in recent years, and few people
are inclined to accept idealism. The relation between idealism and the coher-
ence theory of truth will be worked out in more detail in later chapters.
The belief that reality has no objective characteristics also leads to the co-
herence theory of truth. As stated above, the absence of objective characteris-
tics of reality poses a problem for the correspondence theory of truth. If there
are no objective characteristics then the characteristics and concepts upon
which we depend for statements about the world do not share a privileged
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similarity with reality independent of this context. Because of this, we can-
not depend on this similarity for the truth of our statements. Walker writes
of this that:
The truth of our statements cannot depend upon the character of independent
reality. For independent reality has no particular character; nothing is more,
or less, like anything else independently of the concepts we apply; features,
properties, and hence things themselves are introduced into the world only
by our classification – for things can be identified and individuated only by
their properties. (16)
If not for an independent reality, it seems that the truth of our statements
is based on another set of beliefs – the concepts that we use. From this, a
coherence theory arises in which the truth of a statement depends on other
accepted statements. Wittgenstein, according to Walker, holds such an opin-
ion, in which truth becomes a social matter (1989, p. 17). True statements are
those that cohere with the social practise, and if individual use of a concept
differs, it is wrong.
2.3.2 Epistemological Reasons
It is also possible to hold a coherence theory of truth on epistemological
grounds. One prominent argument for the coherence theory of truth derives
it from the coherence theory of knowledge. This view was, among others,
held by prominent coherentists and idealists such as Bradley, Blanshard and
Neurath (Walker, 167).
The coherence theory of knowledge, rather than being about the nature
of truth, is a theory about justification. It holds that every belief, to be validly
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held, requires justification, which can only come in the form of other beliefs.
This belief requires a justification in turn, and can also only be justified by
reference to other beliefs, which once again need to be justified, and so on.
According to the coherence theory of knowledge, it is absurd to presuppose
that such a chain of justification requires an infinite amount of distinct be-
liefs, and as such it must turn back upon itself, which means that beliefs can
be used to justify beliefs used in their justification. Thus, the justification of a
belief is found in its fitting into a network of beliefs.
An alternative to the coherence theory of knowledge is the suggestion
of epistemologically basic beliefs such as Russellian knowledge by acquain-
tance or beliefs that justify themselves, however, this goes against the core
belief of the coherence theory of knowledge that every belief needs to be jus-
tified by another belief, and as such cannot be accepted by proponents of this
theory.
The coherence theory of knowledge leads to problems if it is held in com-
bination with a correspondence theory of truth. This opens up the possibility
that all our beliefs, no matter how well justified they are, could be false. It
seems that no argument against this can be given under a correspondence
theory of truth. While some might not see this as an important worry, it can-
not be refuted, for any argument against it would merely add to the feeling
of certainty and the justification of the held beliefs. This new argument could
also be wrong, and the world might still be completely different than we be-
lieve. Walker writes of this that:
However convincing, however coherent, however elaborate the arguments by
which we support our beliefs, and however strongly we may hold them, there
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yet remains a possibility that reality may fail to match them, for it is not ob-
vious that ‘this little agitation of the brain which we call thought’ must work
in such a way as to give us the truth of the world. (8)
Those that hold a coherence theory of knowledge and the belief that the pos-
sibility of radical scepticism is absurd have a reason to reject the correspon-
dence theory of truth. As an alternative, the coherence theory of truth seems
a good match to a coherence theory of knowledge, as in this combination,
it is impossible for a justified belief to be untrue, as the truth of a belief lies
exactly in its coherence with other beliefs, just like its justification.
The connection between the coherence theory of knowledge and the co-
herence theory of truth can also be direct. Verificationism holds that while it
is possible for any belief to be false, it is, at least in principle, possible for us to
find out that they are, using the means we have for assessing and evaluating
claims. For verificationists, it is impossible that a claim is false yet impossible
to falsify. Because of this, verificationism leads to an identification of the co-
herence theory of knowledge and the coherence theory of truth. If a belief is
justifiable, then it is true. The claim that there is a possibility that all our jus-
tified beliefs are false is seen as empty or nonsensical: truth is the fitting into
a coherent system, and nothing more. For verificationists, it is not even nec-
essary to accept the coherence theory of knowledge to accept the coherence
theory of truth, verificationism alone provides a good reason. Even without
the coherence theory of knowledge, it is difficult to see how we could reliably
check the truth of beliefs against the world. To provide an alternative to the
coherence theory, some statements have to be given a position of being either
evident or in no need of justification so that they can provide justification for
other beliefs. However, such beliefs might very well be false without a pos-
sibility of finding out that this is the case. We may have to treat these beliefs
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as beyond question, but when accepting the correspondence theory of truth,
there will always remain a gap between belief and reality, no matter how ob-
vious certain things seem. The coherence theory of truth allows us to explain
why doubts about deeply held beliefs are not only pointless, but also wrong.
Opponents of coherence theories of truth state that the coherence theory
leads to idealism, confuses truth with the criterion of truth, and that it must
by its very nature be circular. Furthermore, many feel that it is a radical
theory of truth, in which truth becomes completely separated from the world.
In the fourth chapter, the coherence theory of truth will be explained in a
more detailed fashion, and we shall see that these objections fall short: while
truth is indeed circular in a certain sense, this is not a problem for coherence
theorists. Furthermore, one can hold a coherence theory of truth that does
not confuse truth with the criterion of truth. Finally, while it is possible that
a coherence theory of truth may lead to idealism, this does not necessarily
have to be the case. The relation between truth and reality will be discussed
more in chapter 3.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has given an outline of the different theories of truth. The cor-
respondence theory of truth defines truth as the correspondence between a
judgement and a state of affairs. However, there are problems both if corre-
spondence is taken as a criterion and as a definition of truth. Correspondence
cannot serve as a criterion of truth as we do not have direct access to the facts.
When the correspondence theory is taken as a definition of truth, this intro-
duces the risk of radical scepticism, which some feel is absurd. Furthermore,
it can be doubted whether facts exist, and whether there is a privileged way
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of categorising these facts. Alternative theories of truth are either substan-
tial, like the correspondence theory, in that they say something about what
‘Truth’ is, or deflational, in which case they reject the term ‘Truth’ as a mean-
ingless notion. Deflationism suffers from problems, in that they seem to ar-
gue against the truth of the predicate ‘...is true’ rather than the notion of the
truth or correctness of a judgement. Of the alternative theories, the coherence
theory of truth, which argues that what it is for something to be true is for it
to cohere with a specific set of beliefs, is the most likely alternative.
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Chapter 3
Realism and Idealism
In the previous chapter, the different theories of truth were discussed. From
this discussion, it is obvious that not all theories hold the same view of what
the world is and how our judgements relate to it. To clarify how different
theories view the world, it is necessary to define the terms involved. To this
end, this chapter aims to clarify the different views that go by the names of re-
alism and idealism, particularly the frameworks in which they function and
the manner in which they interact. Firstly, this chapter will aim to give a short
definition of ontological realism and idealism. Secondly, it will differentiate
these ontological theories from the epistemological theories of realism and
idealism. Thirdly, it will look at the interactions between these categories.
3.1 Ontological Realism and Idealism
Ontological realism will be taken as the view that the world as it is exists
independently of how any mind takes it to be. While realism is prima facie
possible for a rich variety of topics, such as ethics, causation, or mathemat-
ics, not every ontological realist accepts mind-independent existence of each
of these areas. A theory can reject the existence of many of these things and
still be distinctly realist (for example, logical positivism presents a particu-
larly scarce image of what exists, whilst still being realist.) It seems, then,
that what determines whether someone is a realist is not what is stated to
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exist, but rather the importance given to mind-independent existence.
Ontological realism consists of two central claims, a claim of existence and
a claim of independence. According to the claim of existence, certain things
exist. In the case of realism of macroscopic objects, this entails that things like
trees and chairs exist, just as facts about these objects, like trees being round
and chairs being wooden. The claim of independence states that these objects
and facts exist independently of any thoughts or thinking mind. Following
this division into two central claims, an attack on realism can take two routes,
attacking either the claim of existence or the claim of independence. While
many critics of the realism of specific things like platonic numbers or ethics
seem to focus on the claim of existence, critics of ontological realism primar-
ily focus on the claim of independence.
Ontological idealism rejects ontological realism by rejecting the claim of
independence. Ontological idealism asserts that reality is fundamentally
mental, mentally constructed, or immaterial. This does not mean that at one
point a mind created the world, as theist philosophies are usually not consid-
ered idealist, but rather that a minds plays a definitive part in the existence of
the world. Ewing states that “They [idealist philosophers] have in common
that there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience”
(3). This rejection of a real world independent of us can be done for many
reasons, but according to Ewing three reasons are most common:
(1) A general theory of knowledge implies that no object can exist apart
from a knowing mind
(2) The view that the particular characteristics of matter logically imply
an experiencing or thinking mind.
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(3) The view that physical objects, while not implying a mind on which
they depend, are themselves of the nature of experience or are physical enti-
ties or some kind. (5)
3.2 Epistemological Realism and Idealism
Realism can and should be divided into two distinct notions, ontological and
epistemological realism. Ontological realism, as we have previously seen, is
the view that there is a world that exists independent from our minds and our
beliefs about it. Epistemological realism, on the other hand, is an epistemo-
logical notion that holds that ontology provides the basis for epistemology.
The epistemological norms of rightness are derived from the way the world
is. Epistemological realism affirms that the correctness of our judgements is
based on, and determined by, the world.
This division can also be made in the case of idealism. Ontological ide-
alism affirms that the ultimate foundation of reality is something mental.
Epistemological idealism on the other hand makes no statements about the
world as it is, but limits itself to making statements about our minds. Accord-
ing to epistemological idealism, everything that we can know and say about
mind-independent entities is influenced to such a degree by the formative
or constructive activities of the mind that no knowledge can be considered
as mind-independent. This is exemplified most clearly in the works of Im-
manuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, who hold that although something
mind-independent exists (das Ding an Sich), our perception is entirely a result
of our own minds (Kant; Schopenhauer). Instead of viewing experience and
knowledge as based on a real world independent from us, we should view
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it as being of a mental nature. Because of this, the correctness of our judge-
ments should not be taken to be based on the world as it exists independent
of us, but as being based on something mental.
While epistemological idealism and ontological idealism have historically
been treated as two separate (although related) concepts, this largely has
been absent in the case of the two realist theories. It seems that there is
confusion between ontological and epistemological realism, and that the dis-
tinction is not often addressed. For example, Putnam (49) and Wright (142)
maintain that ontological realism is not just a theory about the existence of
mind-independent objects, but is also committed to a realist conception of
truth. Others go even further and claim that ontological realism is merely a
thesis about the nature of truth, specifically that truth exists even in cases that
go beyond verification (Miller). Thus, ontological realism is constructed as an
epistemological notion that affirms the law of bivalence (Dummet). This con-
flation of epistemological realism and ontological realism has advanced to
such a far point that epistemological realism is often seen as a truism. Thus,
Alexander Miller states that
Independent of the issue of the relationship between metaphysics and the
theory of meaning, the well-known disquotational properties of the truth-
predicate allow claims about objects, properties, and facts to be framed as
claims about the truth of sentences. Since:
(1) The moon is spherical is true if and only if the moon is spherical
the claim that the moon exists and is spherical independently of anyone’s be-
liefs, linguistic practices and conceptual schemes, can be framed as the claim
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that the sentences ‘The moon exists’ and ‘The moon is spherical’ are true in-
dependently of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes and
so on.
This states that ontological realism can be paraphrased as epistemological
realism. Similarly, many of the critics of this undistinguished version of re-
alism actually seem to target epistemological realism. For example, the lan-
guage acquisition argument argues against realism on the basis that if a link
between the mind and the world existed, language learning would be im-
possible. This argues against epistemological realism, but presents itself as
also arguing against ontological realism. Similarly, the Brain-In-A-Vat argu-
ment purports to show that realism is false by stating that it holds that it is
possible that we could have no knowledge at all of the real world, including
the knowledge that we have no knowledge. This is, it is argued, an absurd
possibility, and because of this realism should be rejected (Khlentzos). How-
ever, this rejection of undistinguished realism bases itself on the assumption
that an ontological realist also subscribes to epistemological realism and thus
affirms that an ideal theory of the world could be completely false. The argu-
ment does not show that ontological realism is false, but merely that the com-
bination of epistemological and ontological realism might have unwanted
consequences.
3.3 Conclusion
As shown in the previous section, what is commonly called realism should
be separated into ontological and epistemological realism. Ontological and
epistemological idealism should also be distinguished. There seems to be
no prima facie inconsistency with any of the combinations of epistemological
and ontological theories. Berkeley is likely the most well-known ontological
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idealists, as he believes that the world is mind-dependent, but he also holds
that the truth of statements depend on that mind-dependent world. Kant is a
well-known epistemological idealist, but is an ontological realist: he believes
in a world independent of the mind, das Ding an Sich, which causes our per-
ceptions. As discussed previously, epistemological realism is often combined
with ontological realism without obvious problems. Finally, epistemologi-
cal idealism and ontological idealism also seem like a possible combination.
While it is probably the least common combination of these concepts, it is
not impossible to believe that there is a world that exists only in the mind of
God, whilst also believing that the truth of our judgements depends on other
judgements.
To avoid confusion, it is necessary that the notions of epistemological real-
ism/idealism on the one side and ontological realism/idealism on the other
side are not conflated, and are seen as distinct notions that do not necessarily
relate to one another in any fixed way.
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Chapter 4
Truth, Epistemology and
Metaphysics
As discussed in the previous chapter, when analysing different theories of
truth, it is important to distinguish the ontological question of the foundation
of reality and the epistemological question of the foundation of the correct-
ness of judgements. This chapter will look at how the correspondence theory
and the coherence theory stand with respect to these two fields.
4.1 Correspondence and Ontology
As previously stated, the notion central to the correspondence theory of truth
is the idea that what it means for a judgement to be true is for this judgement
to correspond to the facts. It holds that the foundation of knowledge can be
found in a certain relation to the world, and is thus epistemologically realist.
Historically, most correspondence theorists have been ontologically real-
ist, but this is not necessary. It is possible to hold that the truth of a propo-
sition is determined by its correspondence to the facts, and simultaneously
hold that these facts are mind-dependent.
26 Chapter 4. Truth, Epistemology and Metaphysics
From the combination of epistemic realism and either ontological realism
or idealism, we can draw the following picture for the correspondence theory
of truth. The correctness of a judgement is determined by the truth of the
content which it expresses. The truth of this content, in turn, is determined
by whether it corresponds to facts or a state of affairs in the world. The world
can either be taken to be mind-dependent or not, depending on the exact type
of correspondence theory and an adherence to either ontological realism or
idealism.
4.2 Coherence and Ontology
We have seen that the correspondence theory is essentially epistemologically
realist. How then, should we view the coherence theory of truth?
4.2.1 Coherence and Epistemological Realism
Nicholas Rescher, in The Coherence Theory of Truth states that we should not
view the coherence theory of truth as giving the meaning of the word ‘true’
(23). Rather, he argues, the coherence theory of truth aims to give us a crite-
rion of truth. The definitional meaning of truth still consists of a relation to
reality:
Yet even if one utterly rejects the core thesis of the correspondence theory that
truth means ‘correspondence to the fact’ (adaequatio ad rem in the old for-
mula), one is still left – in any event – with the impregnable thesis that a true
proposition is one that states what is in fact the case. The link from truth to
factuality is not to be broken, regardless of one’s preferred conception of the
definitional nature of truth. Even the most ardent coherence theorist must
grant, certainly not the premise of the coherence theory that truth means
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correspondence to the facts, but merely its consequence, that truths must cor-
respond to the facts. (Rescher, 28)
Rescher states here that even if the coherence theory of truth tries to replace
the correspondence theory, it will have to do so while accepting epistemolog-
ical realism.
According to this interpretation of the coherence theory of truth, the truth
of a judgement is still determined by its correspondence to the facts. Coher-
ence is given the role of providing a criterion of truth: Rescher holds that
while the definition of truth lies in correspondence, this does not help in
determining which statements actually are true, and he sees coherence as a
possible means to that end. The coherence theory of truth thus becomes a
tool in the search for truth.
Rescher at this point has not yet made it clear in what way coherence
would function as a criterion. He distinguishes between guaranteeing and
authorizing criteria. The difference between the two lies in the relation be-
tween passing-the-criterion-of-being-an-X and actually-being-an-X (Rescher, 4).
When criterion-satisfaction makes failure impossible, we can speak of a guar-
anteeing criterion. If the criterion only offers us a reason to accept something,
it is an authorizing criterion. Depending on what kind of criterion coherence
is, the theory should be seen and treated differently.
Rescher uses reasoning of Blanshard, which argues accordingly:
(1) A coherence theory of truth has to take coherence as the prime test of truth
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(2) If the definition of truth is not coherence but something that is not logi-
cally tantamount to it, this definition can potentially diverge from coherence:
thus, coherence cannot be a guaranteeing criterion.
(3) Since premise 1, it must see coherence as a guaranteeing criterion.
This argument offers us the following problem: a coherence theory of
truth, to be successful, has to give a sufficiently important role to the notion
of coherence. To do this, it seems that coherence has to provide a guarantee-
ing criterion. However, for coherence to be a guaranteeing criterion means
that we also have to view it as the definition of truth. However, as already
discussed in section 2.1, when the definition of truth is taken to be correspon-
dence with the world, a logical gap opens up between justification and truth.
If coherence is to be a guaranteeing criterion of truth, it also has to be the
nature of truth.
Blanshard concludes this as well and states that any proper coherence
theory should not see coherence as a guaranteeing criterion, but rather as a
definition. Blanshard presents a theory in which coherence is a guaranteeing
criterion by accepting a position of epistemological realism but ontological
idealism. Blanshard thus erodes the gap between belief and reality by equat-
ing the world to our beliefs. For coherence to be a guaranteeing criterion, it
needs to play a determining role in how the world is. The world cannot exist
independently, but instead must depend on our beliefs.
Rescher objects to Blanshard’s reasoning. While he does accept that the
conclusion follows from the three premises, he disagrees with Blanshard on
whether the third premise should be accepted. Rescher holds that it is possi-
ble to have a coherence theory of truth that takes coherence as the prime test
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and does not take coherence to provide a guaranteeing criterion. To avoid
ontological idealism, he argues, we have to view coherence as being an au-
thorizing criterion. Rescher justifies a criterial coherence theory in the fol-
lowing manner:
A critic might object: ‘You are not really grappling with the core issue of what
it is to be true but with the merely peripheral question of what is thought
or taken to be true.’ To this we reply: Our concern is not simply with the
factual question of what ‘is thought or taken’ to be true, but with the logico-
epistemological question of what is reasonably and warrantedly to be thought
or taken so. (3)
This might seem like a decent point: a theory that finds true statements can
be useful even if it does not strictly define truth. However, while this might
defend the utility of a criterial coherence theory, it does not establish its posi-
tion as being the prime test of truth.
By stating that coherence serves as an authorizing criterion, and not a
guaranteeing criterion, Rescher admits that it is possible that the coherence
theory of truth can provide us, independently of how likely that may be,
with false positives and false negatives. This means that there is something
beyond coherence which determines truth and has primacy over it. As such,
it seems that, at least in an ideal situation, there is a test of truth that functions
before and above coherence. If this is the case, we cannot justifiably call co-
herence the prime test of truth. It seems Rescher could equally well avoid the
conclusion in a similar fashion by denying Blanshard’s first proposition, and
state that a coherence theory of truth could do without having coherence as
its prime test of truth. However, it is doubtful whether such a theory can still
be called a theory of truth. It neither defines truth nor offers us a preferred
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way of finding it, rather it would merely introduce coherence as a possible
mechanism of finding out some truths.
Rescher’s theory of truth cannot do with just accepting coherence as an
authorizing criterion, but should also explain what the definition of truth is,
and how the two relate. We would also need to find out in what cases coher-
ence can and cannot serve as a trustworthy criterion: if a statement given by
it could turn out to be false, coherence would not solve any of the issues of
the correspondence theory of truth.
This criticism of the coherence theory of truth is similar to that presented
by Thagard in Coherence, Truth and the Development of Scientific Knowledge. He
states that:
If there is a world independent of representations of it, as historical evidence
suggests, then the aim of representation should be to describe the world, not
just to relate to other representations. My argument does not refute the co-
herence theory, but shows that it implausibly gives minds too large a place in
constituting truth. (29-30)
Thagard’s point can be restated in the following manner: if coherence pro-
vides an authorizing criterion, it can be wrong, and we should instead focus
our attention on looking at what actually is the case instead. The fundamen-
tal nature of truth is then put back to correspondence, and to that we should
pay most attention. Coherence can be useful, but only if we determine how
coherence exactly relates to the real world and when it is useful. Thus, co-
herence is turned into a minor tool in the process. This objection can be cir-
cumvented by making coherence a guaranteeing criterion, but, according to
Thagard, this can only be done by accepting ontological idealism.
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As such, regardless of whether we follow Rescher’s argumentation or ac-
cept the criticisms provided against it, it seems that epistemic realism either
leads to the rejection of the coherence theory, or to the acceptance of ontolog-
ical idealism.
4.2.2 Coherence and Epistemological Idealism
According to Walker, in The Coherence Theory of Truth Rescher held that no one
could have taken the coherence theory actually to be a theory about the def-
inition of truth. He does that because, according to Walker, he has accepted
certain of its stock rejections. Particularly, as discussed above, Rescher holds
that while we might deny the correspondence theory of truth by denying that
correspondence is what constitutes truth, we would still have to accept that a
true judgement states what is in fact the case. Walker, however, argues that it
is perfectly possible to accept this while holding coherence as the definition
of truth. The coherence theory of truth, for Walker, holds that:
For a proposition to be true is for it to cohere with a certain system of beliefs.
It is not just that it is true if and only if it coheres with that system, it is that
the coherence, and nothing else, is what the truth consists in. In particular,
truth does not consist in holding of some correspondence between the propo-
sition and some reality which obtains independent of anything that may be
believed about it. (2)
Walker defends this by arguing that statements like ‘true judgements corre-
spond with the facts’ do not commit one to accept the correspondence the-
ory of truth. It is possible not to take this statementas a definition of truth
by denying that ‘the facts’ refer to a metaphysically independent reality. It
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seems to Walker that ‘correspondence with the facts’ is habitually used as an
equivalent to ‘is true’, and we should question whether it is an informative
statement and what exactly ‘the facts’ are. It is very possible to argue that
‘the facts’ are not independent of our beliefs at all, but rather a depiction of
our beliefs. In the opinion of the coherentist, it will be the coherence with the
accepted system of beliefs that determines what ‘the facts’ are.
We are justified, according to Walker, in rejecting the requirement of epis-
temological realism. As such, we can view the coherence theory of truth as
an epistemologically idealist theory, in which the truth and falsity of a judge-
ment is not based on a relation to the world, but rather on a specific relation
to other ideas: coherence. In this version of the coherence theory of truth,
the truth of a judgement is determined by its proposition, and the truth of
the proposition is determined by the coherence of the proposition with other
propositions or judgements.
While the direct relation between judgements and truth on the basis of
coherence is certainly a radical thesis, fewer structural issues stand in its way
than the previous theories of truth. Unlike the theory proposed by Rescher,
it does not need to defend the role that is given to coherence: it simply is
coherence that determines truth. Similarly, it is easier to define than a cor-
respondence theory of truth. It has no need to define what (the) facts are,
what the relation between judgements and facts is, and how judgements can
relate to facts. It simply relies on a certain principle of coherence and a pre-
viously assumed set of judgements to base this coherence on. The principle
of coherence is, once defined, also not a particularly difficult one. As such,
the coherence theory of truth, when defined as an epistemologically idealist
theory, provides a rather clear and accessible theory.
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4.3 Comparison of Different Coherence Theories
The coherence theory can take at least three shapes. Under epistemological
realism, it can either be an authorizing criterial theory, or an ontologically
idealist theory. When accepting epistemological idealism, coherence theory
can be taken as a definitional theory. As already stated above, a theory of au-
thorizing criteria gives relatively little importance to coherence, with doubts
as to what use coherence has at all. What remains are the ontologically ide-
alist and epistemologically idealist versions of the theories. In the previous
chapter we saw four possible reasons for rejecting the correspondence theory
of truth and accepting the coherence theory of truth: a position of ontologi-
cal idealism, verificationism, the desire to refute radical scepticism, and the
position that we can make no meaningful statements about facts, either be-
cause they do not exist or because they do not have an objective character. If
one was led to the coherence theory of truth because of the problems that the
correspondence theory is faced with within the metaphysical framework of
ontological idealism, it seems quite natural that one would accept a version
of the theory that gives coherence a place in determining how the world is.
The position that we can make no meaningful statements about facts quite
naturally leads to accepting a coherence theory of truth on the basis of episte-
mological idealism over one that features ontological idealism. If we cannot
make statements about facts, or if there are no facts, then we cannot let facts
be the determining factor with respect to truth. Instead we are forced to find
something else on which to base truth. The most obvious answer, possibly
the only answer, is to give this position to other judgements. This results in
a position of epistemological idealism. Furthermore, a position of ontolog-
ical idealism would go against the claims that facts do not exist or cannot
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meaningfully be talked about. If the world depends on our thoughts or be-
liefs about it, then the world exists in a determined fashion. For these two
reasons, the position that denies the sense of speaking about facts lead to
epistemologically idealist version of the coherence theory of truth.
It is doubtful whether a coherence theory of truth that accepts ontologi-
cal idealism will help find an answer to radical scepticism. This version of
the theory, as stated above, takes coherence to determine the way the world
is. While the concrete technicalities may differ in different versions of such a
theory, once we accept reality to be constituted as coherence within the col-
lection of judgements and pick a collection of judgements to start with, other
judgements will cohere with those initial judgements. It is now either pos-
sible that those judgements are already part of reality by merit of cohering
with the chosen beliefs, or that they are not yet part of reality until we accept
them. If we assume that reality is not just the set of coherent beliefs that we
have, but rather the set of maximally coherent beliefs, we are once again dis-
connected from reality. It is now, once again, perfectly possible that the world
is different from how we think it is. On the other hand, if we hold that the
world is determined by a set of coherent beliefs that we currently hold, there
is no solidity to reality. With any new experience, it would be possible that
our ideas about the world, and thus our set of coherent beliefs could change.
This would in turn change the way the world is. While in this situation we
have knowledge of how the world is, no argument can be made to give any
primacy to the current way we believe the world to be.
Verificationism runs into similar problems. If reality is composed of the
maximum set of coherent beliefs, there will be judgements that are deemed
‘true’ despite the inability to ever gain real information about it. If we take
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reality to be composed of the set of coherent beliefs one currently holds, real-
ity once again becomes a very unstable concept.
To conclude, it seems that there are two viable interpretations of the co-
herence theory of truth: one that takes the coherence notion to play a role
in constituting reality, and one that takes coherence to constitute the truth
of a judgement, independent of reality. Those that are lead to the coherence
theory of truth by ontologically idealist reasons will be inclined to accept
the ontologically idealist notion, whereas those that are driven to coherence
for epistemic reasons will prefer the epistemologically idealist version of the
theory.
4.4 Responding to the Criticisms of the Coherence
Theory
The previous section established that there are two versions of the coherence
theory that seem tenable. We shall now look whether either of these versions
can avoid the common criticisms of the coherence theory.
4.4.1 The Specification Objection
First of all, I shall discuss the specification objection, originating from Ber
trand Russell. According to this objection, coherence theories cannot identify
the specified set of proposition without contradicting the coherence theory of
truth. The argument goes as follows: The proposition (1) ‘Jane Austen was
hanged for murder’ coheres with some set of propositions. (2) “Jane Austen
died in her bed” coheres with another set of propositions. The specification
objection states that no-one supposes that proposition (1) is true, despite its
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coherence with a set of propositions, but that coherence theorists have no
grounds for saying that (1) is false and (2) is true (Young). According to Rus-
sell, proponents cannot claim that one set of propositions should be given
preference over another set of propositions. Traditionally, this giving of pref-
erence of one set of propositions over another is done with reference to expe-
rience. Harold H. Joachim writes that:
Truth, we said, was the systematic coherence which characterised a signifi-
cant whole. And we proceeded to identify a significant whole with ’an or-
ganised individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled.’ Now there
can be one and only one such experience: or only one significant whole, the
significance of which is self-contained in the sense required. For it is abso-
lute self-fulfilment, absolutely self-contained significance, that is postulated;
and nothing short of absolute individuality – nothing short of the completely
whole experience – can satisfy this postulate. And human knowledge – not
merely my knowledge or yours, but the best and fullest knowledge in the
world at any stage of its development – is clearly not a significant whole in
this ideally complete sense. Hence the truth, which our sketch described, is –
from the point of view of human intelligence – an Ideal, and an Ideal which
can never, as such, or in its completeness, be actual as human experience. (78)
To avoid the possibility of multiple possible sets of allowed propositions with
which a statement can be coherent, Joachim refers to experience and the ideal
nature of the coherence required. According to Russell, both cannot work. Of
the reference to experience he writes:
I am content for the present to point out an ambiguity in the notion of "expe-
rience." The proposition "Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder" consists of
parts given in experience, and put together in a manner which, in other cases,
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is unfortunately also given in experience. And it is possible to apprehend the
proposition, so that in one sense the proposition can be experienced... When
we apprehend the proposition "Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder," this
proposition is, in a sense, a part of our experience; but in another sense, which
is that relevant in constructing the whole of truth, we do not experience this
proposition, since we are not led to believe it. This distinction shows that
experience, in the sense required by Mr. Joachim, consists of apprehension of
truth, and that there is much apprehension which, though experience in one
sense, is experience in a sense in which what is false can also be experienced.
(35)
Russell holds that, seeing how we can experience a proposition which is false,
we need to distinguish between the kind of experiences and further define
which can be allowed to hold this special position. According to Russell, this
can only be done by reference to the experience of truth. This would involve
another notion of truth than the one that the coherence theory of truth claims
as legitimate.
However, it seems that, upon closer inspection, Russell’s criticism is not
valid. His point rests on the fact that we experience propositions which are
false much like we experience other things which are true. However, this
argument rests on a conflation of the experience of a judgement and an expe-
rience of the proposition that that judgement expresses. There is a difference
between experiencing that today is sunny and experiencing the proposition
“today is sunny”. While both are experiences, they are not the same expe-
rience, and they justify us to believe different things. The experience of a
sunny day allows us to believe that the day is sunny, whereas the experience
of the proposition ‘today is sunny’ allows us to believe that we entertained
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the proposition “today is sunny”. A further clarification of the notion of ex-
perience and the difference of a proposition and the event it is about shows
that Russell’s complaint can easily be resolved, and that experience seems
like a perfectly valid special category.
Russell’s objection against the ‘ideal’ nature of Joachim’s coherence the-
ory of truth seems to be more fair.
As for the deus ex machina, the ideal experience in which the whole of truth
is actualised, I will merely observe that he is in general somewhat discredited,
and that idealists themselves are rather ashamed of him, as appears by the fact
that they never mention him when they can help it, and that when they do,
they introduce him with apologetic words, such as "what is true in the end"
– as though what is true "in the end" were anything different from what is
true. (35)
The introduction of the ideal experience or most coherent set of propositions
does appear to solve some immediate problems, for example it solidifies
the notion of truth, in that in an ideal version, it is impossible for truth to
change with any new experience or decision. However, it also reopens prob-
lems whose solution made the coherence theory of truth attractive in the first
place. If what is true is not what is coherent, but what is coherent in an ideal
situation, the possibility of radical scepticism is once again present. What is
ideally coherent could be completely different than anything that we believe.
Furthermore, there could be statements that are ideally coherent that we can
never verify with our standards of justification. However, this is only a prob-
lem in a coherence theory of truth that accepts epistemic realism. When one
accepts that the truth of a statement is related to the way the world actually
is, independently of our thoughts about it, there cannot be more than one
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Truth, as there can only be one way that reality ultimately is, independently
of us. However, it is not obvious that there can only be one truth if one severs
the link between the truth of beliefs and the world as it is independently of
us. When one adopts a coherence theory of truth that accepts epistemic ideal-
ism, one accepts that the truth of a belief is based on its coherence with other
beliefs, but until this point we have not yet defined the scale of the beliefs
that we are taking into account. The coherent system of beliefs when only
taking into account one’s personal experience will plausibly, and even likely,
be different from the coherent system of beliefs that develops when accept-
ing the personal experiences of a whole community or humanity as a whole.
It is at this point not clear which of those forms of the coherence theory we
should prefer. This will be discussed more in-depth in the next chapter. At
this point, I shall only note that different inclusions of personal experiences
will lead to different truths, and that this is not per se problematic.
4.4.2 The Transcendence Objection
The transcendence objection claims that the coherence theory of truth cannot
account for the fact that some propositions are true despite cohering with
no set of belief (Young). There are statements about things which we will
likely never reasonably be able to gain information about. It seems that the
statement “Jane Austen wrote ten sentences on November 17th, 1807” and
statements with a different number are either true or not true. However, it
is unlikely that one such statement will uniquely cohere with a set of beliefs,
owing to the absence of further information about the statements. Still, critics
claim, one of these sentences must be true. Because the coherence theory of
truth cannot accommodate these kind of statements, it must be flawed.
Some versions of the coherence theory of truth can avoid this problem
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altogether. In a version of the coherence theory that bases the truth of state-
ments on coherence with an ideal, or perfect, set of beliefs, these statements
are completely unproblematic, as there is one and exactly one such state-
ment that coheres with the perfect set of beliefs. However, as previously
mentioned, such a version of the theory loses many of the advantages of a
coherence theory.
Alternatively, one can deny the first premise of the argument: a coheren-
tist can say that there are no statements that are true without cohering to a
set of beliefs, as according to this theory, to be true is to cohere with a set of
beliefs. The transcendence objection, then, is a circular argument in which it
is said that truth cannot be based on coherence because there is truth that is
not coherent. This cannot provide an argument against the coherence theory
of truth, as such an argument would need to actually engage the arguments
that lead to the position, rather than just reject the theory as a whole.
4.4.3 Circularity of Truth
The third objection is that a coherence theory of truth makes truth circular,
and that because of this it cannot be accepted. While it is true that the coher-
ence theory of truth makes truth circular, this is not a problem. The reasons
that lead one to accepting the coherence theory of truth already lead one to a
circular theory of truth, as we shall see when we look at the reasons again.
The first ontological reason that we encountered was a belief in ontolog-
ical idealism, in which there is no mind-independent world, and the world
is made up from beliefs or exists only in the mind. If this is the case, beliefs
about this world can never be independent from the world, nor can the world
be independent from the beliefs about it. Regardless of which direction this
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dependence takes place in, there is a circularity: the truth of a belief depends
on the world which in turn depends on a belief which in turn depends on
the world, which repeats ad infinitum. If one accepts ontological idealism,
and with it a circular account of truth, the correspondence theory of truth
can no longer work, as the correspondence notion does not work for a world
which is not mind-independent. In such a situation, the correspondence the-
ory of truth cannot say whether things are true, because the truth of the belief
influences the world to which the correspondence theory compares it. A co-
herence theory of truth can be adapted to explain how beliefs, the world, and
truth interact without leading to inconsistencies.
The second ontological reason to adopt a coherence theory of truth was
the idea that there are no objective characteristics to reality. If our concepts
are not representative of anything in reality, then we also cannot test our
claims by comparing them against reality. The most obvious alternative is to
let the truth of our beliefs be determined by other beliefs. After all, the defini-
tions of concepts play an important, if not fundamental, role in determining
whether the use of a concept is correct. With this, a coherence theory of truth
is adopted. But that is not all that happens: when one makes the move from
letting the truth of a belief depend on other beliefs, one already takes the
step towards a circular notion of truth. The truth of statements depends on
the truth of other statements, which once again depends on the truth of other
statements, and this either leads to infinite regress, unjustifiable statements,
or statements that support statements which support it. The circularity of
truth is a consequence of accepting this ontological reason, not of adopting
the coherence theory of truth.
The same holds for epistemic motivation for the coherence theory. If one
is led to the coherence theory of truth by the belief that the notion of radical
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scepticism is absurd, this also already includes a circular notion of truth be-
fore adopting a coherence theory of truth. As we have seen in chapter one,
the correspondence theory of truth opens up a logical gap between belief
and reality. This gap, however, is problematic for those that feel that scepti-
cism is absurd. Because of that gap, there will always be the possibility that
the world is different from everything we believe, even if actually believing
that the world is fundamentally different from everything we ever believe
is senseless or impossible. The only solution to radical scepticism is closing
this logical gap. This is done, once again, through moving from beliefs de-
pendent on reality to beliefs depending on beliefs. As with the second onto-
logical reason given above, this leads to a circular account of truth. The same
holds for verificationism. If one believes that it is impossible that things are
true without us ever being able to find out whether they are true, it is impos-
sible to have truth depend on an external, mind-independent reality. Instead
it needs to depend on other held beliefs. We see that it is not the case that
the coherence theory of truth leads one to a circular notion of truth. Rather, a
circular notion of truth leads to a coherence theory of truth. Furthermore, if
the coherence theory was accepted on the basis of the notion that truth was
circular, it seems that denying it because truth is not circular is not adequate.
One should rather respond to the arguments given above that seem to in-
dicate that truth must be circular and argue directly with those arguments,
rather than simply deny their conclusion.
4.4.4 Confusion between Criterion and Definition
Another criticism of the coherence theory of truth was the charge that the
coherence theory of truth confuses the criterion and the definition of truth.
While coherence with other beliefs might provide an excellent criterion for
truth, the charge goes, it is clearly not the definition and should not be treated
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as such.
This complaint has been treated in detail above. If we take something as
a criterion, it should be a guaranteeing criterion. If it is not, we should aban-
don it, and aim to find a guaranteeing criterion. However, the only way in
which coherence can be a guaranteeing criterion is if it is related to the nature
of truth, or else it opens up the same logical gap between belief and reality
that was previously mentioned. This is possible through the adoption of on-
tological idealism.
We are left with two possibilities: either we accept coherence as a guar-
anteeing criterion and accept a form of ontological idealism, or we do not
accept it as a criterion. Coherence cannot be a guaranteeing criterion with a
realist framework.
Furthermore, we have seen that coherence can serve as a definition of
truth once we accept epistemic idealism. The issues caused by taking coher-
ence to be the definition of truth are solved by abandoning epistemic realism.
4.4.5 Leading to Ontological Idealism
As discussed in chapter 3, there is a viable version of the coherence theory
of truth that indeed leads to ontological idealism, but it appeals primarily to
those that were led to the coherence theory by ontologically idealist motiva-
tions. Thus, the fact that the theory leads to Idealism can hardly be criticised
in this context. As for those that do not want to adopt a position of onto-
logical idealism and are therefore lead to the coherence theory of truth by
other reasons, it is possible to accept a version of the coherence theory that
is epistemologically idealist, and thus says nothing about the way the world
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is, independent of our ideas. In neither of these cases, the coherence theory
leads to idealism.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the relations between the different theories of truth
and their ontologies. This chapter has shown that there seem to be multiple
viable theories of truth, namely a correspondence theory that presupposes
epistemological realism and either ontological realism or idealism, a coher-
ence theory that presupposes epistemological realism and ontological ideal-
ism determined by coherence, and a coherence theory that presupposes epis-
temological idealism. While there are many differences between these three
theories, there is one thing that they have in common. To be a substantial
theory of truth, a theory has to say when a judgement is true and when it
is not. It can either do so on the basis of something mind-dependent, or on
the basis of something that is not, but in both cases there is something objec-
tive that determines whether judgements are true. This position we can call
metaphysical realism. Through offering a concrete account of what it is for
the content of a judgement to be true, they also offer a concrete account of
what it is for an act of judgement to be correct. This seems to be an essential
characteristic of a theory of truth. To give a definition of truth is to say when
judgements are correct and thus to present a correctness-notion. Similarly, if
one gives a correctness-notion, one has to (at least covertly) adopt a certain
definition of truth. If one can be wrong, there must be something by virtue
of which it is wrong, and that something is a theory of truth.
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Chapter 5
The Origins of Post-Truth
As stated in the introduction, the phenomenon that we are interested in ex-
plaining is that of post-truth in contemporary politics, specifically with re-
gard to its relation to truth. Now that we have established an overview of the
different theories of truth, we will look at what exactly post-truth is and the
history of post-truth. This will provide more insight into the phenomenon,
and allow for a better analysis.
5.1 What Is Post-Truth?
The term post-truth gained prominence when the Oxford Dictionary named
it the Word of the Year 2016. They defined it as "Relating to or denoting
circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief" ("Post-Truth"). They,
similarly to Searle, state that the ‘post’ in post-truth does not refer to being
beyond truth in a temporal sense, but that in a sense truth has become irrel-
evant. The core claim of the idea that we live in a post-truth political era is
that in contemporary politics (and contemporary discourse as a whole) it is
no longer facts that determine whether beliefs are held, but rather political
bias, emotions, and ideology.
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The idea that contemporary politics are ‘post-truth’ was the result of the
political situation in 2015 and 2016, with both the Brexit vote and the US
presidential elections suffering from a general abandonment of evidential
standards, fake news, and outright lying of politicians. Among the state-
ments made by these campaigns was the claim that the United Kingdom
had to pay the European Union 350 million pounds every week that would
be spent on the National Healthcare Service if the UK left the EU, a claim
made with little evidence which was retracted and removed from their web-
site soon after the Brexit-referendum, or the claim that e-mails published by
Wikileaks show that during her time as U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clin-
ton approved weapon sales to ISIS, where the published e-mails show no
such thing (Lichfield). While both campaigns made plenty statements that
were, even at the time, easily falsifiable, it did not seem to negatively impact
them, as both campaigns had great success and won their elections.
The post-truth trend continued after the elections, with President Donald
Trump claiming that he had had the largest electoral victory since Ronald
Reagan, while the official numbers presented a very different picture, or that
the US murder rate was at a forty-seven year high, while figures from the
FBI showed it to be near an all-time low (Revesz; Wilson). Once again, the
inaccuracy of these statements did not seem to affect Donald Trump, nor did
the many inconsistencies in his policies and contradictions in his statements.
This combination of both a carelessness about whether the world would
support their statements and a seemingly complete lack of negative reaction
to these false statements led many to believe that there was an international
trend where people in power “feel emboldened to try to bend reality to fit
their opinions, rather than the other way around” (McIntyre, 18).
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Post-truth describes this quality of contemporary politics. Truth no longer
seems to be something people care about, and judgements are accepted not
on the basis of whether they can be justified or are true, but rather on the
basis of personal preference and ideology. Post-truth politics is the name of
the political system in which politicians can make claims without any regard
for the world or any fear of potential fallout for these claims. It describes
a political situation in which emotion and ideology seem to have taken the
place of rationality.
5.2 Rise of the Post-Truth Era
In the previous section we have established what is meant by ‘post-truth’.
However, while there are certain qualities in contemporary politics that can
be called ‘post-truth’, it is not clear how these qualities appeared in politics.
This section will aim to clarify this by presenting an overview of the elements
that caused post-truth. The overview presented in this chapter will be heav-
ily based on the work of Lee McIntyre’s "Post-Truth".
The qualities of the post-truth era can be traced back to three other pro-
cesses, namely science denialism, changes in modern media, and post-
modernism. This section will for each of these processes explain how they
led to the current political situation, and explain their relation to the concept
of truth.
5.2.1 Science Denialism
In some aspects, science is going through a golden age. Advances in physics
allow for technology that previously was unimaginable. Vaccination erad-
icated many diseases that were once deadly. Agricultural advances feed
millions of people previously suffering from food scarcity. Yet despite these
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modern successes of science, there seem to be more people questioning the
methods and results of science than ever before. McIntyre writes that “Once
respected for the authority of its method, scientific results are now openly
questioned by legions of nonexperts who happen to disagree with them”
(17). This can be seen in many areas in modern politics, such as the debates
surrounding the existence of man-made climate change, the effectiveness of
vaccinations, the effects of smoking on the human body, and even whether
the Earth is really round.
Science denialism is caused by two things, namely a misunderstanding
about science and the result of an intentional effort by people with an eco-
nomic or ideological interest denying specific scientific results.
McIntyre argues that some of the modern distrust of science is based on
confusion concerning the term ‘theory’. He states that “Some of this is based
on a straightforward misunderstanding (or cynical exploitation) of how sci-
ence works, based on the mistaken idea that if scientists would just gather
enough evidence they could prove a theory” (19). The idea is that scientific
theories are ‘just theories’, interpreted as meaning ’an unproven conjecture’.
If this is the case, why would scientific theories be preferable to other theo-
ries? If evolution is a theory, and thus unproven, why should we prefer it
over other explanations such as intelligent design? The mistaken assump-
tion here is that a scientific theory is unsupported conjecture that could be
proven if enough empirical data was gathered; a scientific theory can never
be proven. However, this does not mean that it is not empirically supported.
The other cause for the rise of science denialism is more malicious. In
1953, a paper that had recently been published that linked the tar from
cigarettes to cancer in lab mice threatened the profits of the tobacco industry.
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Public relations expert John Hill proposed to the heads of all major tobacco
companies that:
Instead of continuing to fight among themselves over whose cigarettes were
healthier, they needed a unified approach where they would ‘fight the science’
by sponsoring additional ‘research’. (McIntyre, 23)
On the basis of this proposal, the Tobacco Industry Research Committee was
created. The goal of this ‘research institute’ was to stop the damage that the
studies linking cigarettes to cancer would do to these companies’ profits, at
any cost. To do that, it was necessary to convince the public that there was
no danger.
They funded alternative research to cast doubts on the tobacco-cancer link ...
They distributed pamphlets and booklets to doctors, the media, policy makers,
and the general pubic insisting there was no cause for alarm. The industry’s
position was that there was ’no proof’ that tobacco was bad, and they fostered
that position by manufacturing a ’debate’, convincing the mass media that re-
sponsible journalists had an obligation to present ’both sides’ of it. (Oreskes
& Conway, 16)
Through this, they aimed to convince the public that there was no scientific
consensus, the media that both sides of the story should be given equal at-
tention, and politicians not to act against the interest of the tobacco industry.
This strategy led to great successes for the tobacco industry, who main-
tained these practices until 1998, when they finally agreed to close the To-
bacco Industry Research Committee as part of a settlement deal of a 200 bil-
lion dollar lawsuit. Their success was the start of a widespread phenomenon
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of large corporations using their resources to influence public opinion on top-
ics that might affect their profits. “The goal of this stratagem is simple: to halt
progress on issues that their clients oppose either for financial or ideological
reasons” (Rabin-Havt, 4). The tobacco industry started a trend that is now
commonly used in the business and political world, among others by the oil
industry, pharmaceutical companies, and the NRA. An entire industry has
sprung up around the Tobacco-strategy.
What we see today is a highly organized industry built around the creation
and dissemination of falsehoods supported by a media environment that aids
and abets its work. Facts are conjured in purportedly academic studies that
have only the thinnest veneer of legitimacy. In 2014, one corporate lobbyist
explained to the New York Times, ‘Once you have the study, you can point to
it to prove your case – even if you paid to get it written.’ (Rabin-Havt, 5)
This is done specifically to create a political situation in which there is no
consensus on what exactly ’the facts’ are. If there is no such consensus, it is
impossible for people to act on this consensus.
That this process is still working in contemporary politics can most clearly
be seen in the climate change debate. While there is a broad scientific con-
sensus that climate change both exists and is man-made, this consensus is
not clearly shown in modern media. McIntyre writes that “Although there is
virtually no scientific debate over the question of whether the global temper-
ature is rising and humans are the primary cause of it, the public has been
hoodwinked into thinking that there is a great scientific controversy over this
issue” (21). This is partially, as we shall see in the next section, a result of how
modern media functions, but also the result of a specific campaign by those
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financially invested in the use of fossil fuels to obscure the scientific consen-
sus.
It is clear that science denialism does not have a specific relation to the
concept of truth. Rather than saying something about truth, both sides of the
trend of science denialism can be combined with any of the ontological views
and theories of truth that we have encountered. The lobbyists and those they
work for do not reject the existence of ‘truth’, they merely attempt to obscure
one specific truth, so that the consequences of this particular truth does not
interfere with their personal financial or ideological agenda. Similarly, those
that believe the claims made by these lobbyists are also not committed to one
specific world view. It is not that these people reject the existence of ‘facts’
or the idea that certain sentences can be either true or not, but rather it is
a specific set of beliefs that they reject as true, or at least reject as definitely
true. This is perfectly compatible with both the correspondence theory and
the coherence theories we have seen. One can hold that for a sentence to be
true is for it to correspond to a state of affairs in the world, whether that world
is mind-independent or not, and still disagree with someone about whether
a specific statement is true or not. One can equally well hold a coherence
theory and still disagree with someone else as to whether a specific sentence
should be included into our set of accepted beliefs.
5.2.2 Modern Media
The second element in the rise of post-truth are the changes in modern me-
dia. These changes can be divided into two parts, namely the changes that
happened to old media, and the rise of new media.
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Traditional media underwent a large shift with the start of the Rush Lim-
baugh show in 1984, a radio talk show that was the first of its kind in that
it was explicitly partisan. Up until this point, news had been provided by
newspapers and TV channels such as CNN, whose intention was to provide
the news in a fashion that was as objective as possible. Rush Limbaugh, how-
ever, argued that these traditional news sources suffered from a distinctly
liberal bias, and view himself "... as a source of truth in opposition to the rest
of American media" (Nichols, 146). Limbaugh sought to give a voice to the
rest of the American public and had great success with this, especially after
his show went over to a national radio station in 1988. Seeing the success of
the Rush Limbaugh show, others also became interested in providing parti-
san coverage of the news, and other partisan media sources such as MSNBC
and Fox News were founded. These networks gave a heavily politicised ver-
sion of the events happening throughout the day. For example, after a school
shooting that took the life of twenty elementary school students, Fox News
executives sent out a specific directive to their producers not to allow any
discussion concerning gun control (McIntyre, 70).
As a reaction to the creation of partisan media and the claims that they
themselves were also partisan, traditional media doubled down on their
claims to provide objective coverage of the news. As a result of this, the new
partisan networks not only influenced the way in which news was brought
to the American public directly, but also indirectly through the changes this
caused in traditional media. In an effort not be seen as yet another parti-
san news channel, traditional news media emphasised their impartiality. To
show that they were objective, they made it an explicit goal to cover both
sides of every important issue. However, this had unintended side-effects.
McIntyre writes that:
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Far from increasing objectivity, this had the ironic effect of lowering their
commitment to providing accurate news coverage ... The mantra of objectiv-
ity was reflected in a resolve to provide ‘equal time’ and a reflex to ‘tell both
sides of the story’ even on factual matters . . . By allowing ‘equal time’, the
media only succeeded in creating ‘false equivalence’ between two sides of an
issue even when there were not really two credible sides. (77)
In an attempt to appear objective and unbiased traditional media led people
to believe that many questions were still open for debate, and that there was
no scientific consensus on these topics.
These changes in traditional media led to the current ‘post-truth’ politi-
cal situation in two ways. First of all, partisan news allowed certain political
groups to manipulate the news by only airing that what they wanted to be
seen. Because many people only watch the channel that best matches their
personal political preference, this leads to information-discrepancies and dif-
ferent perceptions of the world between different political groups. Secondly,
traditional media, through an extreme commitment to ’objectiveness’, justi-
fied these different perceptions of the world, as a new mantra of unbiased-
ness and showing both sides of the debate created false equivalences between
viewpoints and justified unjustifiable positions.
The problems caused by old media were further aggravated by the rise
of social media. This is because of two reasons. First of all, the articles and
posts that one shares are primarily shared with one’s own contacts. Owing
to the fact that most people are primarily connected with those with a simi-
lar socio-economic position and world view, this leads to the formation of an
online echo-chamber. In this echo-chamber, one only hears the kind of news
that reaffirms what one already believes in. If an individual who does not
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believe in climate change primarily knows other people who do not believe
in climate change, and gets most of his news from social media, the news
that he receives will likely reaffirm his belief that climate change is not real.
McIntyre writes that “It is no secret that one of the recent facilitators of the
‘information silo’ - which has fed our built-in predilection for confirmation
bias - is the rise of social media” (63).
It is not just that one’s worldview is reaffirmed through membership of
a group of likeminded people. Even if one aims to step out of this echo-
chamber and intentionally follows or subscribes to information outside of
one’s direct community, the information one receives is likely to be biased
in favour of one’s pre-conceived worldview. Differing information is likely
to be filtered out by the social media providers. As a part of their strategy
to provide as enjoyable an experience as possible to the users, companies
like Facebook use algorithms to determine what posts appear on one’s so-
cial media account. This algorithm selects posts that are in line with one’s
interests ("News Feed Values"). This further reduces the amount of articles
one encounters that challenge one’s world view, and instead only provides
information that is in line with what a person already believes.
As such, new media worsen the effects of the modern old media, in that
they give different communities different perspectives on the world and reaf-
firm their pre-existing beliefs, whether those beliefs are true or not.
Like with science denialism, there seems to be nothing about the prob-
lems created by the state of modern media that relates in a specific way to
‘truth’. Once again, all parties involved can consistently claim to value and
aim at truth. The disagreement between these parties is not about whether
we should care if our beliefs are true or not, but rather which beliefs are in
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fact true.
5.2.3 Post-Modernism
The final element in the rise of post-truth politics is post-modernism. While
less obviously and less directly a cause of the post-truth era, there is sig-
nificant evidence that post-modernism influenced and strengthened the pro-
cesses that lead to post-truth. To show this, it will first be necessary to discuss
what post-modernism is, and secondly to show how it influenced the rise of
post-truth.
The discussion on the core concepts of post-modernism will be heavily
based on the work of Richard Rorty, as he provides a clear overview of the
parts of post-modern thought most closely related to Truth. This part of post-
modernism Rorty also calls pragmatism. He states that this change of termi-
nology
“is not merely out of American chauvinism. I use it because the alternative
term, ‘post-modernism’, has been ruined by over-use. I have no idea what the
philosophical views of Nietzsche and such post-Nietzschean philosophers as
Heidegger, Derrida or Foucault have to do with recent changes in architec-
ture and painting.” (13)
Pragmatism is used to distinguish between the post-modern conception of
truth and the political project that followed from post-modern foundations.
At the core of post-modern thought, Rorty argues, is the rejection of truth
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as providing a measure for our beliefs. He writes that “These views are corol-
laries of the denial that there is any order which exists independently of hu-
man languages and human history” (14).
According to Rorty, the root of this view can be traced back at least to
Spinoza. He writes that:
Before Spinoza, it seemed obvious that any two competing descriptions of
what is going on could be compared in point of adequacy. The less adequate
description could then be deemed a description of appearance, and the more
adequate a description of reality. But as soon as one deploys the idea of equally
adequate descriptions, one will begin to wonder whether it matters whether
one is talking about the same reality under two adequate descriptions, or
about two different appearances of the same reality. As soon as one begins to
raise that question, one begins to slide from Spinoza’s utterly knowable sub-
stance to Kant’s utterly unknowable thing-in-itself. For as soon as one admits
that two irreconcilable descriptions can describe the same thing equally well,
one has to ask whether there is any reason to believe that either description
has anything to do with things as they are in themselves – things as unde-
scribed. (16)
For Rorty, the idea of truth as correspondence to reality should be rejected,
as we have to wonder whether we can really say that any of our descriptions
have anything to do with the world as it is. "Pragmatism", Rorty writes,
"raises the possibility that to have an order is simply to be described in a
language, and that no language is any more natural – any closer to the way
things really are – than any other” (17).
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Rorty adopts a view similar to epistemological idealism, but does not ac-
cept that this leads to something like a coherence theory. While a coherence
theory of truth aims to give a best explanation of the world through a co-
herent view of our beliefs, Rorty rejects the notion that our beliefs should
be judged on the basis of anything in the world. Rather than wondering
whether things really are as we say they are, pragmatism holds that we
should adopt beliefs on the basis of how useful they are to us. Fundamen-
tally, however, there is nothing that makes a belief ‘true’ or not. Rorty thus
rejects the entire notion of metaphysical realism. For post-modernism, there
is no standard by which to judge our beliefs. “For the so-called ‘post-
modernists’, the adjective ‘true’ is a perfectly useful tool, but the use of the
noun ‘Truth’ as the name of an object of desire is a relic of an earlier time: the
time in which we believed that there was a natural order to be grasped” (23).
Post-modernism influenced many aspects of science denialism. This can
most clearly be seen in the debate surrounding Intelligent Design Creation-
ism (IDC). Robert Pennock argues in his work The Postmodern Sin of Intelligent
Design Creationism that “post-modernism [is] the mother of IDC” (766) and
provides statements of Philip Johnson, one of the founders of ID theory, who
has stated that
The great problem from the Christian viewpoint is that the whole controversy
over evolution has traditionally been phrased as a Bible vs. Science issue, and
the question becomes how do you defend the Bible? . . . Now, the problem with
approaching it this way is that in our culture it is understood that science is
some objective fact-finding proceeding. And if you are arguing the Bible vs.
Science, then people think that you are arguing for blind faith against objec-
tively determined knowledge. (Pennock, 759, qtd. in McIntyre, 137-138)
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To avoid this, Philip Johnson argued for a post-modern perspective. This
post-modern perspective could be used to promote intelligent design, be-
cause it argues that correspondence to the world is not a quality that should
determine whether we accept a certain belief.
On the radical postmodern view, science has no special privilege over any
other views of the world even with regard to matters of empirical fact; every
tribe may take its own story as the starting point for its other beliefs. ID
creationists are equally justified in taking God’s creation and will for man as
their starting assumption. (Pennock, 762, qtd. in McIntyre 139)
A similar approach is also taken by some in the Trump campaign, for exam-
ple Mike Cernovich, of whom McIntyre say that he is a ‘pro-Trump’, ‘Amer-
ican Nationalist’, ’conspiracy-theory-loving blogger with 250.000 twitter fol-
lowers’. Cernovich was responsible for among others claims that Hillary
Clinton was suffering from heart problems and claims that she was involved
in a child paedophilia scandal at a Washington pizza restaurant (McIntyre,
149). Cernovich stated that “Look, I read postmodernist theory in college. If
everything is a narrative, then we need alternatives to the dominant narra-
tive. I don’t look like a guy who reads Lacan, do I?” (McIntyre, 150).
Post-modernism strengthens the position of those that disagree with cer-
tain scientific results.
If there is no truth, and it is all just perspective, how can we ever really
know anything? Why not doubt the mainstream news or embrace a conspir-
acy theory? Indeed, if news is just political expression, why not make it up?
Whose facts should be dominant? Whose perspective is the right one? Thus
is postmodernism the godfather of post-truth. (McIntyre, 150)
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If there is no preferred way of describing the world, then there is nothing that
we can point to as evidence to prefer a certain point of view over another.
Why then should we prefer the view of scientists over those with ideological
motivations?
Of the processes described so far, post-modernism is the first that can
properly be said to be post-truth, in the philosophical sense discussed earlier.
It explicitely rejects the use of truth, and denies that correspondence to the
world, coherence with other beliefs, or anything else can provide an objective
tool to judge beliefs by.
5.3 Conclusion
This section has outlined the multiple factors that led to the current ‘post-
truth’ climate. First of all, powerful companies and individuals learned to
effectively use their resources to obscure findings that threaten to harm them
financially or ideologically from properly being received by the public. Sec-
ondly, modern media causes different political groups to hold different
worldviews and accept different authorities, by providing specific informa-
tion to specific groups, reaffirming the individual’s world view through echo-
chambers, and justifying certain ideas by presenting them as equal alterna-
tives to scientifically supported beliefs. Finally, post-modernism provided
people with a philosophical justification for the worldview that they present.
As a whole, this lead to a situation in which groups hold beliefs that seem
completely insane and incoherent to other groups, and it is (close to) impos-
sible for different groups to agree on what really is the case. To every group,
it seems that every other group bases their opinions on feelings rather than
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fact. From each of these viewpoints, every other position seems to be post-
truth.
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Chapter 6
Is the Post-Truth Era Post Truth?
In the first chapters we have seen the different substantial theories on Truth,
more specifically the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence the-
ory of truth, and the things they have in common, specifically metaphysi-
cal realism, the claim of the existence of a correctness-notion. In the previ-
ous chapter we have seen how certain processes, namely science denialism,
changes in the modern media landscape, and the theory of post-modernism,
together led to an era in which those with financial or ideological motivations
learned to spread the message that they want to get out and in which differ-
ent groups hold entirely different views of what is going on in the world.
This chapter will analyse whether the claims that opinion has surpassed re-
ality in importance in the process of forming beliefs and whether the modern
political era is ’post-truth’ in a philosophical sense are correct. Do facts and
truth really not matter in the formation of belief in contemporary politics?
6.1 Post-Truth for Whom?
In the previous chapter we saw that many of the divisions in contemporary
politics are the result of a powerful lobby industry that has learned how best
to manipulate the media and the public, which is strengthened by media that
is either partisan or overly committed to being seen as objective by present-
ing ‘both sides of the story’, and by the philosophical justification provided
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by post-modernism. This political situation thus clearly has two different
groups involved, namely those who are in charge of shaping the flow of in-
formation and those who merely consume this information. It is by no means
necessary that both these groups have the same attitude towards truth. It is
important, then, not to look at post-truth as one specific quality that all of
modern politics does or does not have, but rather as a quality that different
parts of the political process might have.
Because of this, this thesis will analyse whether contemporary politics can
be called ’post-truth’ by looking at the relationship of two different groups
to truth. These groups we shall call ’the general public’, those that primarily
consume news about specific topics, and ’the informational elite’, those that
are in charge of shaping the news and presenting their worldview to others.
It is important to note that this is not a strict distinction. First of all, the divide
is very topical, for example, a scientist that studies climate change would be
considered part of the informational elite on the topic of climate change, but
is likely part of the general public when it comes to claims about the effects
of smoking. Secondly, it is possible to be part of both groups on one topic.
Especially with the rise of new media, it is possible to consume information
while at the same time spread information for others to consume.
6.1.1 The General Public
When one looks at the contemporary political landscape, it is undeniable
that there are divides in belief based on ideological and political factors. This
might give credence to the claim of post-truth that statements are accepted
not on the basis of the facts but on emotional and ideological arguments, but
this is not necessarily the case. We have seen that the post-truth era was
caused by a divide in who is accepted as a trustworthy authority and what
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information was provided. This divide runs primarily along political and
ideological lines. For example, while many republicans watch Fox News,
few non-republicans do. As a result, the information that is provided to each
group is very different. Thus, while in contemporary politics it is ideology
and opinion determine what one believes in, this is not owing to a contem-
porary trend in which people do away with the notion of truth. Rather, it is
the consequence of a thoroughly divided society in which different groups
accept very different methods of reasoning and different sources of informa-
tion.
Different groups are drawn to different types of media, and accept differ-
ent people as authority figures. Furthermore, problems with modern media
ensure that people no longer have access to a neutral view that mediates be-
tween different groups. Because of this, different groups reach different con-
clusions about what the facts are, to the point that to someone outside of that
group it seems like these beliefs are based purely on ideology. Any member
of such a group, however, will say that their beliefs are based on facts, and
that the other group ignores the facts and bases their beliefs on ideology. The
disagreement does not concern the role of facts in the formation of beliefs:
both sides can perfectly maintain that facts are important and should be the
primary reason to accept beliefs. The disagreement lies in what ‘the facts’ are.
To accept a judgement is to accept that what that judgement says is true.
It is impossible to accept a judgement whilst believing that what it says it not
the case. This leads to situations similar to Moore’s paradox, which is the
sentence ‘It is raining, but I do not believe it is’. This is paradoxical because
the assertion of the sentence ‘It is raining’ in itself contains the belief that it
is raining, which is denied by the second part of the sentence. Similarly, the
sentence ‘I believe it is raining, but it is not the case’ is a sentence that we are
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at no point justified to assert. To assert that it is not the case that it is raining
is to assert that you do not believe that it is the case.
This links back to an issue that we originally encountered when discussing
the correspondence theory of truth. While it might seem obvious, even tauto-
logical, that what is true is all that is the case, we can question to what extent
this statement helps us determine what to believe. We hold to be the case
that what is said by our accepted judgements. It is impossible to step out of
this first-person framework and actually compare our beliefs to the world, as
the world is not something we have direct access to.
The coherence theory of truth offers a clear explanation of this problem.
As seen, the coherence theory, when taken as a guaranteeing criterion of
truth, holds that reality is not something that we can access beyond our sen-
sations of it, and that ‘truth’ is the quality assigned to a set of beliefs that is
consistent. If a set of beliefs is not coherent, then at least one of the beliefs has
to be false and has to be rejected. The choice of which belief to reject, how-
ever, is not determined by anything specific about the beliefs in question,
but rather by other considerations such as simplicity, communal support, or
figures of authority. Because of this, there can be different people who both
have a coherent system of belief, while the two systems of belief can still
clash. Different groups of people value different things and accept different
people as authorities, and because of this end up with different views of how
the world is, even if they are given the exact same information to work with.
There is one clear point of evidence for the idea that the general public
still values the ideas of truth and factuality, namely their use of correctness-
notions. We saw in the first part of this chapter that the one shared charac-
teristic of the substantial theories of truth was that of a correctness-notion. If
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one wants to be able to judge things as incorrect, then one has to hold some
notion of truth. This correctness-notion is very clearly present in contempo-
rary politics. For example, those that believe that climate change does not
exist do not only hold their belief, they also hold that the group that does be-
lieve that climate change exists is wrong. If one completely rejects the notion
of truth, as we have seen in the part about post-modernism, one cannot say
that any description of the world is more accurate than another. If people in
contemporary politics say that one description of the world is more accurate
than another, they must hold at least some substantial theory of truth.
6.1.2 The Informational Elite
It seems that the general public has not shifted beyond the concept of truth,
and that the divisiveness in the post-truth era is in fact a result of partisan me-
dia that promotes and reinforces pre-existing biases in groups, which in turn
leads to vastly different world views in different political groups. The ques-
tion then remains, are those that are in charge of promoting specific world-
views also still attached to the concept of truth?
One of the instances that is often stated as the most clear expression of
the post-truth era is the use of the term ‘alternative facts’ by a white house
spokesperson. As we have seen before, John Searle characterises this event
as one in which she “did not refer to the trivially true claim that there are
facts beyond the facts currently discussed, but rather that there might be one
acknowledged fact, and another equally valid fact that is inconsistent with
the first” (88). Does her statement necessarily mean that she holds that there
are mutually inconsistent facts that can both be equally true or valid? The
most charitable interpretation would be that she meant that one person has
one set of beliefs that they call facts, and the spokesperson believes in other
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things, and thus has alternative facts. Nor would a less charitable interpre-
tation necessarily pin her down to a position in which she forms beliefs on
the basis of opinion, without any reference to the way the world is. As a
spokesperson for the Trump administration, it is perfectly plausible that she
herself did not believe in the statements that she was defending, and that her
defence of them was merely a part of her job as press secretary of the Trump
administration.
Similar explanations can be given for the behaviour of those that take part
in the spread of partisan or biased information. While it is possible that their
behaviour is based on a post-modern notion of truth, it is equally possible
that their behaviour is merely the result of self-interest or genuine belief.
It seems that the informational elite itself can also be divided into three
groups, namely into those people that genuinely believe in the claims that
they spread, those that do not believe in the claims they spread, and those
that adopt a post-modern position and merely present a claim because it is
useful.
In the case of the people that genuinely believe in the claims that they are
spreading the situation is very similar to that of the general public. To be-
lieve a judgement is to believe that what this judgement says is actually the
case, which entails a belief in facts. Similarly, a genuine belief in the truth of a
judgement is accompanied by a belief that inconsistent judgements are false,
which necessitates a theory of truth.
As for the people that do not believe the claims they are spreading, it is
perfectly possible to believe in truth and still lie to further one’s own interest.
The previous chapter has shown that much of the spread of misinformation
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concerning topics like climate change and the effects of tobacco was the re-
sult of a specific belief that the acknowledgement of the scientific consensus
would result in loss of profits. This shows that while lobbyists might present
claims that they do not hold to be true, their behaviour is still based on a
belief that they accept as true. From this we can, as in the previous cases,
conclude that they hold a theory of truth.
It is possible that there are people that neither believe the claims they
spread are true nor that they are not true, through a post-modern rejection
of the concept of ’truth’. However, it seems likely that the majority holds a
classical view of truth. While post-modernism is used by those in the lobby
industry to support their points of view, this does not necessarily show an
actual belief in the views expressed by post-modernism. It is equally possible
that this is to provide a philosophical justification for the views they propose
out of self-interest, rather than a true interest and belief in these arguments.
There seem to be no arguments beyond the use of post-modernist rhetoric
used to justify certain position to indicate that there is an especially large
amount of post-modernists in modern politics, nor that the amount of post-
modernists in politics has undergone a large change in the past years.
6.2 Conclusion
Rather than a rejection of truth and facts as formative and important concepts
for the correctness of judgements, post-truth politics is the result of a deeply
divided society that makes extensive use of partisan media, which is used
by powerful people wishing to further their self-interest. However, even if
everyone were to accept the arguments provided here, this would not solve
the problems in contemporary politics. This is the result of the same issues
that plagued the correspondence theory of truth. To a liberal, it might seem
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obvious that, for example, Fox News and the Arms lobby have misled part
of the American public on the topic of gun safety, and that post-truth can be
resolved by showing this part of the public what really is the case. However,
this other part of the American public will feel equally strongly that it is this
liberal that is misguided and needs to be shown what really is the case. Even
if everyone accepts that it is necessary to only believe what is true, there is
no objective way to determine what exactly that is. If we adopt a correspon-
dence theory, we have to accept that all our experiences are biased, and even
our most deeply-held beliefs could fail to correspond to the facts. If we adopt
a coherence theory, it is possible that different people have equally coherent
sets of belief, both based on their own experiences. In neither case does the
notion of truth help us establish what is true, merely what it is for something
to be true.
The problem that contemporary politics faces is that the shared basis of
accepted beliefs has shrunk. This cannot be resolved by stating what is true,
as stating that something is true does little more than reaffirming the orig-
inal statement. If a consensus needs to be reached, this needs to happen
through dialogue and a communal agreement on standards of reasoning and
accepted authorities. This can only happen through a long process in which
all sides accept at least some of the same sources of information, and enter
into discussions with one another in which they are willing to change their
mind.
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Conclusion
This thesis set out to analyse the notion of post-truth. Its goal was to find
out whether it was actually the case that in contemporary politics beliefs are
formed on the basis of ideology and opinion rather than on the basis of fact,
and whether the notion of truth has become unimportant in contemporary
politics. It did this by first determining what truth can be taken to mean, and
secondly, through looking at the origins of post-truth, analysing the relation
between post-truth politics and truth.
This thesis looked at the most commonly held theory of truth, the cor-
respondence theory of truth, and showed that it was fundamentally episte-
mologically realist. This epistemological realism opened up the possibility
of radical scepticism, which causes some to reject the theory. As an alterna-
tive, this thesis presented the coherence theory of truth and the deflational
theory of truth. Deflationalism was rejected because it seemed to be primar-
ily focused on the semantic predicate ’is true’, rather than the notion of the
truth of a judgement. There are two possible coherence theories, one that is
epistemologically realist and ontologically idealist and takes coherence to be
a determining element of reality, and one that is epistemologically idealist.
The one characteristic that is shared by the theories presented is the accep-
tance of metaphysical realism: for something to be a theory of truth, it has to
present a correctness-notion. Similarly, if someone uses a correctness-notion,
a theory of truth has to be present.
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This analysis has shown that there is no significant difference in the role
that truth and the facts play in contemporary politics compared to past pol-
itics. While there is no consensus about what the facts are for a lot of topics,
the discussions surrounding these topics are still made up of statements that
are taken to be true or false. From this we can conclude that correctness-
notions, and thus theories of truth, are present in contemporary politics.
Rather than being caused by an absence of care for truth, the post-truth situ-
ation is the result of communities within one political system that are possi-
bly more divided than ever before. These communities have vastly different
views of how the world is. This is a result of specific lobbying by those with
certain ideological or financial interests, media that reinforces pre-existing
beliefs and gives validity to beliefs that originally had none, and a philosoph-
ical justification of these beliefs through post-modernism. However, while
the philosophical threat of a political situation completely uninterested in
truth seems to be absent, one cannot deny the difficulties of politics in the
‘post-truth’ era.
If we wish to stop this post-truth era, it will be necessary to undertake
steps to stop these processes from happening. To do this, it would first of all
be necessary to strongly increase regulations of lobbying corporations to en-
sure that they no longer have the capability to influence politicians, take out
advertisements with misinformation, and fund false researches. Secondly,
changes have to be made with regard to modern media. Non-partisan media
should rethink what it means to provide objective news, and tell the stories
of what happened to the best of their ability, rather than presenting any topic
as a discussion between equally valid views. The role of social media on ev-
eryday life should also be rethought, either by changing the algorithms used
to prevent the occurrence of information bubbles, or by changing the impor-
tance that it is given in our everyday lives. Finally, if we think that truth is
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an important notion, it is necessary to academically engage with the theory
of post-modernism, and provide counterarguments to their points. These so-
lutions are neither quick nor easy. However, if we want to create a situation
in which there is at least some consensus about how the world is, these steps
need to be taken.
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